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Setting the Stage 
In its broad or global sense, idealism is the metaphysical doctrine that the ultimate nature 
of the universe is mental rather than material, or alternatively, that concrete truths about the 
universe are grounded in mental rather than physical facts. In this broad sense, idealism is in 
clear opposition to materialism, namely the doctrine that the underlying nature of the universe 
is physical rather than mental, or that concrete truths about the universe are grounded in phy-
sical rather than mental facts. 
Although it is common to define idealism as a global metaphysical doctrine in opposition 
to materialism, in the 17th and 18th centuries idealism was often understood more narrowly 
as a version of Berkeley’s “esse est percipi” thesis, namely the claim that the way things are is 
nothing but the way things appear to us. Regarding this, the crucial opposition is not between 
idealism and materialism, but rather between idealism and realism, namely the claim that the 
way that things really are is irreducible to the way things appear to us. In light of such idealism, 
what we call “external reality” is illusory or at best subjective: the outside world is grounded in 
the experiences of an outside reality had by observers.






Narrow anti-realist and broad anti-materialist idealisms have quite different motivations. 
Narrow anti-realist idealism is most commonly driven by epistemological questions regarding 
external-world skepticism and is typically associated with the sort of empiricism that resists 
postulating hypotheses about the existence of outer things that go beyond appearances. Even 
though Berkeley has never mentioned Descartes, he is quite clear about this: if what we can 
only immediately know are ideas, their putative objects can only be known inferentially (a tenet 
shared by almost all empiricists of the 17th and 18th centuries), and it is assumed that “esse est 
percipi” is the best way to close the doors on external-world skepticism. In other words, narrow 
anti-realist idealism is often proposed as the antidote to external-world skepticism. 
In contrast, broad anti-materialist idealism is often driven by metaphysical questions 
about the ultimate nature of the mind and about the ultimate nature of reality and tends to go 
with the sort of rationalism that allows metaphysical hypotheses that go well beyond appearan-
ces if they help us to make sense of the universe as a whole. The traditional taxonomy of idealist 
views distinguishes between subjective idealism, objective idealism, and absolute idealism. As 
these varieties of idealism do not have clear standard definitions, they are often characterized 
as much as appealing to paradigmatic proponents (Berkeley, Schelling, and Hegel, respectively) 
as to specific doctrines. 
Yet, Kant was not quite clear about the meaning of “idealism.” In his Refutation Kant as-
serts and reiterates that his target is the so-called “problematic idealism” that he rightly or wron-
gly attributes to Descartes. The first problem is to figure out whether the “problematic idealist” is 
the Cartesian skeptic of the first Meditation, the idealist skeptic of the third Meditation, or some 
nonskeptic idealist. To make things even worse, in a later reflection Kant announces at least five 
different targets: skepticism, idealism, Spinozism, as well as materialism and predeterminism 
(AA, 18: 627-628). I assume here that Kant’s target is best understood by his own definition of 
idealism, namely, as the metaphysical claim that “there are none other than thinking beings; 
the other things that we believe we perceive in intuition are only representations in thinking 
beings, to which in fact no object existing outside these corresponds” (PROL, AA 4: 289). In 
this metaphysical sense, idealism is a kind of monism. According to idealists, the fundamental 
features of our world (or at least its fundamental contingent features) are all of one kind—the 
conscious kind. In this sense, idealism is a doctrine that quite different philosophers such as 
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exponent was Mendelssohn. Kant opposes to metaphysical idealism what Kant calls his “dua-
lism.” Kant’s dualism is phenomenal rather than metaphysical as Descartes’s. Kant’s main claim 
against idealism is that the ultimate nature of reality is noumenal rather than mental. 
The embarrassing question is how Kantian transcendental idealism (TI henceforth) fits 
into the overall taxonomy, considering Kantian criticism as a fusion of both empiricist and ratio-
nalist traditions. As Allais recently remarked, “there is no agreement in interpretations of Kant’s 
transcendental idealism, not even a tendency to convergence” (2010b: 9). This disagreement 
could be ignored if TI was only a marginal doctrine in his first Critique, instead of lying at the 
very heart of the work. 
What we find in the literature is the existence of two main camps and several positions 
in between. At one extreme, there are those who read TI as a sophisticated version of subjective 
idealism by interpreting the transcendental divide between appearances and things in themselves 
as the metaphysical opposition between two numerically distinct entities or realities: phenomenal 
and noumenal underlying reality. In accordance with the literature, let us call this the two-world 
view. The idea traces back to Kant’s distinction between the mundus sensibilis and the mundus in-
telligibilis in his Dissertatio. The mundus sensibilis is the cognizable phenomenal world inside our 
minds. The mundus intelligibilis is the non-cognizable noumenal world outside our minds. 
At the other extreme, there are those who read Kant’s transcendental divide as the mere 
epistemological opposition between two perspectives of the same world, one considered from 
the human viewpoint and the other from God’s perspective, sub specie aeternitates, so to speak. 
In this sense, Kant’s idealism is not a metaphysical doctrine or even a doctrine with metaphy-
sical commitments. The underlying assumption here is that the Kantian transcendental divide 
between things in themselves and appearances is epistemological and methodological rather 
than metaphysical. In accordance with the literature, let us call this the two-aspect view.
Allais seeks to tread a middle ground between the two extremes. On one hand, against 
Allison’s metaphysical deflacionism, she defends a metaphysical moderate interpretation which 
sees Kant holding that things of which we have knowledge have a way they are in themselves 
that is not cognizable by us. On the other hand, against ontological phenomenalism, she de-
fends the view that the appearances of those things in themselves are genuinely mind-depen-





In this paper, I present a new reading of transcendental idealism. For a start, I endor-
se Allison’s rejection of the traditional so-called two-world view and hence of Guyer and Van 
Cleve’s ontological phenomenalism. But following Allais, I also reject Allison’s metaphysical 
deflacionism: transcendental idealism is metaphysically committed to the existence of things in 
themselves, noumena in the negative sense. Nevertheless, in opposition to Allais, I take Kant’s 
claim that appearances are “mere representations” inside our mind seriously (epistemic pheno-
menalism). She overlooks Kant’s main difference between the transcendental and the empirical 
sense that things are “inside us” and “outside us.” On the empirical sense, appearances are out-
side us as the undetermined object of our sensible intuition. Yet, on the transcendental sense, 
appearances are inside us, namely as the mind-dependent way that noumena manifest inside 
our minds and, hence, our mind-dependent way of knowing the mind-independent reality in 
itself (epistemological phenomenalism).1 
The defense of my reading is first based on abundant textual evidence and on a criticism 
of the two main rival readings. First, I argue that my reading is the view that best fits Kant’s 
Fourth Paralogism without imputing to Kant a Berkeley-like ontological phenomenalism or 
some naïve realism (Stroud, Hanna). Second, I also argue that my reading is the one that best 
fits the recent reading of Kant’s Refutation as proof of the existence of things in themselves, viz. 
noumena (as I will show to be manifest in several passages). Finally, assuming that Kant did 
not change his mind in between the first and the second editions (that is, taking his own words 
at face value), I also argue that my view is the reading of TI that best harmonizes the Fourth 
Paralogism with the Refutation of Idealism as two complementary arguments. 
1 My reading has nothing to do to what Allais calls noumenalism: “Kant thinks that objects which could 
be known by an intellect alone would be non-spatio-temporal and non-sensible things, such as Cartesian 
souls and Leibnizian monads, a fundamentally different kind of thing than the spatio-temporal objects of our 
knowledge. The extreme metaphysical reading of transcendental idealism takes Kant to be committed to the 
existence of noumena in this sense (a position I call noumenalism), as well as to the claim that we cannot know 
such objects, and also sees him as a phenomenalistic idealist with respect to the objects of experience—things 
as they appear to us. At the other extreme are proponents of deflationary views which deny that Kant’s trans-
cendental distinction is an ontological one, seeing it instead as an epistemological or methodological distinc-






All the same, I must admit that none of these arguments is conclusive: one may contest 
that a desirable reading of the Fourth Paralogism must avoid ontological phenomenalism (like 
Guyer and Van Cleve). For one thing, the textual evidence does not cut much ice with one or 
the other reading. Likewise, one may dispute that TI must be in agreement with the Refutation 
of idealism and dispute that the Refutation is proof of the existence of noumena (rather than of 
persistent phenomena in space). Finally, pace Kant, one may claim that the Fourth Paralogism 
and the Refutation of idealism are actually incompatible, by suggesting that in the second edition 
Kant changed his mind and gave up the view he defended in the Fourth Paralogism. The moral to 
be drawn here is that such disagreement between readings of TI cannot be solved on the basis of 
primary literature alone. All rival readings of TI find support in the primary literature. How shall I 
proceed? The defense of my reading of TI is a classic case of inference to the best explanation. I will 
confront all the rival opposing readings and show that my own is by far the most coherent and the 
one that best accommodates and reconciles the Fourth Paralogism and the Refutation of idealism. 
Given this, the paper is structured as follows: In the next section, I present the historical 
background to the controversy over the reading of Kant’s idealism. Then, I present Paton’s and 
Prauss’s two-aspect view, and in particular Allison’s deflationary version of the two-aspect view. 
The following section is devoted to presenting and criticizing Allais’s anti-phenomenalist claim 
that appearances are not mere representations inside the mind. Following that is a brief pre-
sentation of my reading. The final sections are devoted to showing that my view is the one that 
best harmonizes the Fourth Paralogism and the Refutation of Idealism. 
1 Historical Background
As Oberst (2015: 54) reminds us, the contemporary debate over the transcendental divi-
de between appearances and things in themselves has its origin in Prauss’s Kant und das Pro-
blem der Dinge an sich (1974). Still, the crucial disagreement about the nature of Kant’s trans-
cendental idealism in Kantian scholarship is anything but new. The controversy dates back to 
the famous Feder-Garve review2 that appeared between the first and the second editions of 
2 The C. Garve (1742–98) and J. G. Feder (1740–1821) review was published on January 19th, 1782 (Feder 
and Garve 1989).





the first Critique. The reviewers portray Kant’s idealism as a metaphysical doctrine similar to 
that of Berkeley.
To be sure, in his Fourth Paralogism, Kant endorses Berkeley’s general claim that the ea-
siest way of avoiding external world skepticism is to assume that what we call “material things” 
are nothing but representations in us. However, while Berkeley has never identified the Car-
tesian provenance of external-world skepticism, Kant clearly identifies the problematic idealist 
as a Cartesian. According to Kant’s accusation, the Cartesian mistakes the empirical sense of 
“things outside us” for the transcendental sense of “outside us” as noumena. Given this, the 
transcendental divide seems to be a metaphysical opposition between objects that only exists 
inside our minds and noumena. Appearances and things in themselves are metaphysically dis-
tinct objects. In this way the putative Kantian two-world dualism was born. Kantian two-world 
dualism plus reductionism finds textual supports in passages like this:
The transcendental idealist, on the contrary, can be an empirical realist, hence, as he is called, 
a dualist, i.e., he can concede the existence of matter without going beyond mere self-consciousness 
and assuming something more than the certainty of representations in me, hence the cogito, ergo 
sum. For because he allows this matter and even its inner possibility to be valid only for 
appearance – which, separated from our sensibility, is nothing – matter for him is only a spe-
cies of representations (intuition), which are called external, not as if they related to objects that 
are external in themselves but because they relate perceptions to space, where all things are 
external to one another, but that space itself is in us. (KrV, A370, emphasis added)
The two-world view was the one that prevailed until the end of the 19th and beginning of 
the 20th centuries. At the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, traditional scholars of Kant3 still 
held a two-world view of idealism even when they rejected the Berkeleian ontological pheno-
menalist reading. According to Smith, for example:
Since the time of Kant, and largely through his influence, the uncompromising Berkeleian 
thesis, that ‘material’ Nature is mind-dependent, has, indeed, been displaced by what, ini-
tially at least, is the more modest, though also usually much less definite, claim that Mind 
and Nature stand in relations of mutual implication. (1925:8)






Now, if the Fourth Paralogism tries to avoid skepticism by assuming à la Berkeley that 
material things are nothing but ontological constructions out of mental states, whereas the 
Refutation aims to prove the existence of mind-independent things outside us that are not 
representations in us, there is a blatant contradiction between the two philosophical projects. 
According to Kemp Smith (1923:301), for example, the Refutation “proves the opposite of what 
is stated in the first edition,” and is a “striking contradiction between Kant’s various Refutations 
of Idealism.” Similarly, Vaihinger (1884:131–2) notes that it is impossible to find an interpreta-
tion that can reconcile this “stark contrast,” because the two “relate to each other as yes and no, 
as affirmation and negation, as A and not-A. They were, are, and remain irreconcilable.” Finally, 
according to Guyer (one influential living Kantian scholar), “Kant’s new Refutation of Idealism 
was meant to break with his reductionism of 1781” (1987:288). 
On closer inspection, however, something crucial has been overlooked in the literature. 
Even though there is no reasonable doubt that Kant attempted to avoid the Cartesian exter-
nal-world skepticism in a Berkeleian way, Feder-Garve’s review accused him of being an anti-
-materialist idealist (a “spiritualist” in Kantian words) rather than an anti-realist idealist (esse est 
percipi). Let us take a look: 
An idealism that encompasses spirit and matter in the same way, that transforms the world and 
ourselves into representations, that has all objects arising from appearances as a result of the 
understanding connecting the appearances into one sequence of experience, and of reason 
necessarily, though vainly, trying to expand and unify them into one whole and complete 
world system. (Feder and Garve 1989:193. Emphasis added)
That reading is reinforced by the Kantian reply to them. As Erdmann (1878/1973) showed, 
the plan of the Prolegomena was largely modified to afford an opportunity to reply to this “inex-
cusable and almost deliberate misinterpretation, as if my system transformed all the things of 
the sensible world into sheer illusion” (PROL, § 13, Note III, AA 4: 290). The same idea is stated 
in the famous letter to Beck: 
Messrs. Eberhard and Garve’s opinion that Berkeley’s idealism is the same as that of the 
critical philosophy (which T could better call *the principle of the ideality of space and time) 
does not deserve the slightest attention. For I speak of ideality about the form of representa-





tions, but they interpret this to mean ideality on the matter, that is, the ideality of the object. 
(BR, AA 11: 395)
Additional evidence that the controversy does not turn on the question of whether there 
are outer things beyond appearances (realism) or whether outer things should be reduced to 
mere appearances (anti-realism) comes from the fact that in 1781 Kantian idealism is discussed 
in the Paralogism, a chapter of Critique dedicated to the metaphysics of the soul. Indeed, in the 
Fourth Paralogism, Kant’s seems to go hand-in-hand with anti-materialist idealism or spiritu-
alism. In A383, he states:
Why do we have need of a doctrine of the soul grounded merely on pure rational principles? Wi-
thout doubt, chiefly with the intent of securing our thinking Self from the danger of mate-
rialism. But this is achieved through the rational concept of our thinking Self that we have given. 
For according to it, so little fear remains that if one took matter away then all thinking and 
even the existence of thinking beings would be abolished, that it rather shows clearly that if 
I were to take away the thinking subject, the whole corporeal world would have to disappear, as this 
is nothing but the appearance in the sensibility of our subject and one mode of its representations. 
(KrV, A383, emphasis added)
What drives the debate is not primarily the epistemological problem of Cartesian exter-
nal-world skepticism, but crucially the metaphysical question about the ultimate nature of rea-
lity and of the soul. What Kant vehemently rejects is Feder-Garve’s accusation that he is a spi-
ritualist. Regardless of whether Kant was in 1781 an anti-materialist idealist or not, Guyer (and 
all his predecessors quoted above) must be wrong when he claims that “Kant’s new Refutation 
of Idealism was meant to break with his reductionism of 1781” (1987:288). An anti-materialist 
idealist (spiritualist) does not need to assume that esse est percipi. 
2 The Two-Aspect View
In the twentieth century, the debate over the nature of Kantian idealism was much more 
focused on the transcendental divide between things in themselves and appearances. Accor-






Prauss (1974), the transcendental divide is not a metaphysical one that opposes two realms of 
reality, the phenomenal and the noumenal. Instead, the divide opposes different perspectives 
on the same reality. According to the two-aspect view, mundus sensibilis and mundus intelligibi-
lis are the only two ways of considering the existing world, that of the human and that of the 
absolute, God’s, perspective, sub specie aeternitatis, so to speak. From the human perspective, 
the world takes the form of appearances (Erscheinungen) as the objects of our sensible represen-
tation, while from the God’s-eye-view perspective, the same world takes the form of things in 
themselves. 
Allison’s two-aspect view has at least two great predecessors. Prauss (1974), for example, 
has argued that Kant’s transcendental distinction is not between appearances and things in 
themselves, considered as different kinds of things, but rather between two ways of considering 
the same thing, that is, in itself and as it appears to us. However, to my knowledge, the founding 
father of the two-aspect view is Paton:
What is the relation between things-in-themselves and appearances? Kant never questions 
the reality of things-in-themselves, and never doubts that appearances are appearances of 
things-in-themselves. The appearance is the thing as it appears to us, or as it is in relation to 
us, though, it is not the thing as it is in itself. That is to say, things as they are in themselves are 
the same things that appear to us, although they appear to us, and because of our powers of 
knowing must appear to us, as different from what they are in themselves. Strictly speaking, 
there are not two things, but one thing considered in two different ways: the thing as it is in itself 
and as it appears to us. (1970: 61, emphasis added)
The two-aspect view seems to be supported by compelling textual evidence. In the Prefa-
ce to the second edition, Kant states explicitly: 
that the same objects can be considered from two different sides, on the one side as objects of 
the senses and the understanding for experience, and on the other side as objects that are merely 
thought at most for isolated reason striving beyond the bounds of experience. If we now find 
that there is agreement with the principle of pure reason when things are considered from 
this twofold standpoint, but that an unavoidable conflict of reason with itself arises with a 
single standpoint, then the experiment decides for the correctness of that distinction. (Bx-
viii–xix n. emphasis added.) 





In the Transcendental Aesthetic, we also find abundant evidence that seems to favor of 
the two-aspect view: 
We can accordingly speak of space, extended beings, and so on, only from the human stan-
dpoint. If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can acquire outer 
intuition, namely that through which we may be affected by objects, then the representa-
tion of space signifies nothing at all. This predicate is attributed to things only insofar as they 
appear to us, i.e., are objects of sensibility. (A27/B43, emphasis added)
But they did not consider that both (space and time), without their reality as representations 
being disputed, nevertheless belong only to appearance, which always has two sides, one whe-
re the object is considered in itself (without regard to the way in which it is to be intuited, 
the constitution of which however must for that very reason always remain problematic), 
the other where the form of the intuition of this object is considered, which must not be 
sought in the object in itself but in the subject to which it appears, but which nevertheless 
really necessarily pertains to the representation of this object. (A38/B55, emphasis added)
Regardless of whether this textual evidence supports the two-aspect view, it certainly jeo-
pardizes the traditional two-world view. Kant’s distinction between formal and material idealism 
inspired Allison to take a step further and assume his deflationary reading of Kantian idealism. 
Not only is the transcendental divide epistemological or methodological. Allison also claims that 
Kantian idealism does not make any metaphysical commitment whatsoever. In his words: 
This idealism is “formal” in the sense that it is a theory about the nature and the scope of the 
conditions under which objects can be cognized by the human mind. It is “critical” because it 
is grounded in a reflection on the conditions and limits of discursive cognition. (2004: 35–6)
However, here I follow Allais when she claims against Allison’s deflationary reading that 
Kantian idealism is metaphysically loaded. She summarizes her criticism thus:
However, from the fact that Kant … is not a Berkeleian idealist, it does not follow that he is 
not committed to there being a way things are in themselves, which we cannot cognize, or 






(non-Berkeleian) sense. And while the claim that we cannot know things in themselves is, 
of course, an epistemic claim, this does not mean that it involves no metaphysical commit-
ment--such as a commitment to the existence of an aspect of reality which we cannot cognize. 
(2010a: 1, emphasis added)
It does not follow that transcendental idealism does not make metaphysical claims since a 
distinction between two ways of considering things is compatible with making metaphysi-
cal claims about the aspects of things so considered. (2010a: 3)
3 Epistemological Phenomenalism
I do not find a single piece of textual evidence that appearances are not representations 
for Kant. In A129, for example, he says that appearances “only exist in us.” In B164, he states 
that appearances “are only representation of things.” Likewise, he reiterates in A250 that appe-
arances “are nothing but representation.” In A386, we can read the very same statement: “appe-
arances are merely representations in us.” In A387, he phrases this slightly different as follows: 
Appearances are not “in the same quality as they are in us as things external to us.” The same 
idea is to be found in several Reflections from the period after the publication of the second edi-
tion of the first Critique: 
Appearances are representations insofar as we are affected. The representation of our own free 
self-activity is one in which we are not affected, consequently it is not appearance, but 
apperception. (Refl. AA, 17:688, R4723, emphasis added)
A thing in itself does not depend on our representations, and can thus be much greater 
than our representations reach. But appearances are themselves only representations… (Refl. AA, 
18: 379, R5902, emphasis added)
Now since in inner sense everything is successive, hence nothing can be taken backwards, the 
ground of the possibility of the latter must lie in the relation of representations to something 
outside us, and indeed to something that is not itself in turn mere inner representation, i.e., form 
of appearance, hence which is something in itself. (Refl. AA, 18: 612, R6312, emphasis added)





For what contains representations combined in relations of space and time is mere appearance. 
(Refl. AA, 18: 673, R6342, emphasis added)
The merely subjective element in intuition as the representation of an object is appearance. 
(Refl. AA, 18: 687, original emphasis)
However, the passage that I consider to be decisive is the one where he defines his own 
transcendental idealism: 
We have sufficiently in the Transcendental Aesthetic everything intuited in space or in time, 
hence all objects of an experience possible for us, are nothing but appearances, i.e., mere 
representations, which, as they are represented, as extended beings or series of alterations, 
have outside our thoughts no existence grounded in itself. This doctrine I call transcendental 
idealism. (A490/B518, emphasis added)
Yet, what we find in the literature are only numerous attempts by interpreters to explain 
this identification away. What is in question is whether there is a way of denying that Kant is 
thereby assuming some Berkeleian ontological phenomenalism. For a question of space, I focus 
on three attempts: Longuenesse (2008) and Collins (1999) and Hanna (2006). Collins limits 
himself to the statement that with the identification of appearances with mere representations 
in us, “Kant never meant to erode the outerness of objects of outer sense” (1999:72). However, 
Collins is mistaking the transcendental for the empirical sense of “outside us”. To be sure, in the 
empirical sense, Kant never denied the externality of things of outer sense. For example, the 
computer I am using now is certainly outside me in this empirical sense. Still, in the transcenden-
tal sense, they are all inside us as mere representations (even the computer that appears to me 
in space outside me in the empirical sense is nothing but a mere representation in me in the 
transcendental sense). 
According to Longuenesse, “in us does not mean here ‘within our mind’”, but “within 
the scope of the thought I think” (2008:27). However, Longuenesse is mistaking the transcen-
dental opposition between things inside (appearances) and outside (things in themselves) for 
the opposition between nonconceptual and conceptual mental states. Things outside the scope 






relevant transcendental sense) rather than things outside us. Longuenesse’s reading cannot 
account for any passages quoted above. Furthermore, in the famous passage of § 16 of the B-de-
duction Kant explicitly assumes that something could be represented in me without being able 
to be accompanied by the I think.4 What happens, in that case, is that the representation in me 
would mean nothing to me, that is, would be blind or would not contribute to cognition (Erken-
ntnis). Moreover, when we take a look at all the passages quoted above, none of them supports 
Longuenesse’s reading that Kant was opposing things outside and within the scope of thought. 
However, our crucial issue is whether there is another sense of “appearance” as the object 
of our representations. To be sure, in the opening paragraph of the Transcendental Aesthetic 
Kant states that “the undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called appearance” (A20/
B35). In the same vein, Kant states: 
[T]he understanding can never accomplish a priori anything more than to anticipate the 
form of a possible experience in general, and, since that which is not appearance cannot be 
an object of experience, it can never overstep the limits of sensibility, within which alone 
objects are given to us. Its principles are merely principles of the exposition of appearances, 
and the proud name of an ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic a priori cognition of 
things in general in a systematic doctrine (e.g., the principle of causality), must give way to 
the modest one of a mere analytic of the pure understanding. (A247/B303)
Still, the problem is: if we assume the two-aspect view, we cannot metaphysically distin-
guish between appearances and noumena. According to Allais though: 
Kant’s idealism should be understood as saying that our cognition is limited to essentially 
manifest features of reality, that he thinks such features are empirically real (not merely in 
our minds or constructions out of what is merely in our minds), and that he thinks they are 
grounded in a way things are independent of us, which we are unable to cognize. (2015:259)
This passage clearly betrays Allais’s tacit endorsement of the traditional two-world view. 
4 “The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something could be re-
presented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would be 
impossible or else at least would be nothing for me.” (B131-2)  





If “our cognition is limited to essentially manifest features of reality” (2015:259), or we are com-
mitted to “the existence of an aspect of reality which we cannot cognize” (2010a: 1), it is because 
she assumes that there are some underlying non-manifest features or aspects of some hidden 
unknowable reality. The point is that there is no middle way between the two-aspect reading 
and the two-world reading. Allais merely replaces the old two-world dualism for a new meta-
physical two-aspect dualism. The easiest way of solving the problem is to disentangle metaphy-
sical from epistemological claims. Metaphysically speaking, appearances and noumena are one 
and the same thing. But epistemologically speaking, appearances are the mind-dependent way 
that mind-independent noumena manifest inside our minds. Allais mistakes Kantian episte-
mological for Berkeleian ontological phenomenalism. 
4 Noumenal Metaphysical Monism
Now, assuming that “appearances” are the mental way that noumena appear inside our 
minds as mere representations, we can also allow that we cognize or get acquainted with (ken-
nen) them (appearances) by means of our senses. This is what Kant states in several passages:
“Noumenon” correctly always means the same thing, namely the transcendental object of 
sensible intuition (This is, however, no real object or given thing, but a concept, in relation to 
which appearances have unity), for this must still correspond to something, even though we 
are acquainted with nothing other than its appearance. (AA 18: 231, R5554, emphasis added)5
In slightly different words, “appearances” are how the mind-independent world appears 
to us mind-dependently as something inside our minds with which we can get acquainted (ken-
nen). Yet, it must be clear from the outset that I am not endorsing Berkeleian ontological pheno-
menalism. In my view, Kant is not claiming that what we call the external world is nothing but a 
construction made out of mind-dependent sense-impressions. What he is saying is that we can 
5 This view is not entirely new. Kemp Smith in his famous Commentary of A104-10 claims that a “care-
ful examination of the text shows that by it he means the thing in itself, conceived as being the object of our 
representations” (1923/2003: 204). However, in opposition to what I will argue here for Smith, such a view is a 






cognize or get acquainted with the way things in themselves mentally appear to us as human 
beings. The question now is how I can combine this phenomenalism with noumenalism. 
The answer is quite easy: they represent the epistemological and the metaphysical sides 
of Kantian idealism. My view rules out the traditional dualism between (outside) worlds and as-
pects of worlds: the underlying nature of the outside world in the relevant transcendental sense 
is made up of mind-independent things in themselves. And my view embraces phenomenalism 
because, from an epistemological viewpoint, we can only cognize this existing mind-indepen-
dent outside noumenal world as it mentally appears inside our minds as mere representations. 
5 The Refutation of Idealism
In the previous section, I claimed to have already shown that my reading of Kantian 
idealism is the one that best fits Kant’s various assertions that appearance is nothing but mere 
representation. In this brief section, I show that my noumenal realism is the one that best fits 
the dominant view today of Kant’s Refutation of idealism. 
To begin with, it is worth noting that the standard two-world view does not fit Kant’s Re-
futation of Idealism at all. According to the two-world view, things in themselves and appearan-
ces are metaphysically distinct entities, and phenomena are nothing but constructions arising 
out of mental states. Now, if metaphysical idealism is the doctrine that the underlying nature 
of reality is made up of mental states, how could idealism be refuted by some proof that the 
underlying nature of reality is mental? 
Still, someone might believe that the two-aspect view better fits Kant’s Refutation of 
Idealism. According to Allison, for example, as the proof of real things is mind-independent 
appearances in space, the Refutation of Idealism is not just compatible with the two-aspect 
view, but it also presupposes it: 
Moreover, the Refutation of Idealism is not merely compatible with transcendental idealism, 
properly construed; it presupposes it. In order to appreciate this, we must keep in mind that 
its goal is to demonstrate the objective reality of outer intuition, that is, the existence of 
objects in space (Bxxxix) […] but this goal cannot be accomplished on the transcendental 





realistic assumption that our outer intuition or experience must be of things as they are in 
themselves. (Allison 2004:300)
On closer inspection though, Kant contradicts Allison when he says that the Refutation 
proves the existence of something that is not an appearance:
If the world were an epitome [ein Inbegriff] of the things in themselves, so would it be im-
possible to prove the existence of a thing outside the world; [...] But if we take the world 
as appearance, it proves just to the existence of something that is not appearance. (Refl, AA, 
18:305, R5356)6
Allison complains that if we take outside objects as appearances, the Refutation becomes 
impossible indeed. However, under his deflationary two-aspect view, we cannot understand 
either Kant’s motivation for the Refutation of Idealism or the proof itself. For one thing, the 
problematic Cartesian idealist proves to be a transcendental realist in the first place (see A369). 
Thus, for him, genuine knowledge is only knowledge of outer things in the transcendental sen-
se of things in themselves. So then, by assuming from the outset that the Kantian opponent in 
the Refutation of Idealism cannot be a transcendental realist, Allison is begging the question 
against the Cartesian skeptic or idealist at issue. 
That is why many scholars have gradually come to the opposite conclusion: If successful, 
the Refutation proves the existence of things in themselves. To my knowledge, Pritchard (1909) 
was the first contemporary Kantian scholar (early-twentieth century) to hold that the Refuta-
tion proves the existence of our outside objects as they are in themselves. According to him, the 
argument of the Refutation of Idealism can only be accepted if we consider permanent subs-
tances as things in themselves. At the same time, Pritchard was an isolated voice and received 
much criticism from Paton (1970), among others.
6 “Wäre die Welt ein Inbegrif der Dinge an sich selbst, so würde es unmöglich seyn, das Daseyn eines Din-
ges ausser der Welt zu beweisen; [...]. [...]Nehmen wir aber die Welt als Erscheinung, so beweiset sie gerade zu 






However, since Guyer’s work (1987), numerous scholars have endorsed this conclusion. 
According to Bader (2012), for example, if the Refutation is successful, then it establishes the 
existence of phenomena, which would license us to infer the existence of noumena as the ultima-
te foundation of phenomena. Chignell (2010) endorses the causal inference of the phenomenon 
of the thing in itself on the basis of Guyer’s (1987, 2006) interpretations. Almeida (2013) moves 
beyond mere causal inference and reminds us of the intentional status of our own representa-
tions. Shared by all of these authors is the belief that only by reference to the noumenal world 
can one make sense of Kant’s statement that “the perception of this persistent thing is possible 
only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside 
me” (B275). 
Indeed, against Allison’s position, there is reasonably good textual evidence supporting 
the assumption that the goal of the Refutation of Idealism is to prove the existence of noumena. 
For questions of space, I limit myself to a few quotes. In the year 1790, the period just after the 
publication of the Refutation, Kant states clearly in one of his many reflections:
We remain in the world of the senses [crossed out: however], and would be led by nothing 
except the principles of the [crossed out: law] understanding that we use in experience, but 
we make our possible progression into an object in itself, by regarding the possibility of 
experience as something real in the objects of experience. (Refl, AA, 18:278, R5639)
We must determine something in space in order to determine our own existence in time. 
That thing outside of us is also represented prior to this determination as noumenon. (Refl, 
AA 18:416, R5984)
Now since in inner sense everything is successive, hence nothing can be taken backwards, 
the ground of the possibility of the latter must lie in the relation of representations to so-
mething outside us, and indeed to something that is not itself in turn mere inner represen-
tation, i.e., form of appearance, hence which is something in itself. The possibility of this 
cannot be explained. – Further, the representation of that which persists must pertain to 
that which contains the ground of time-determination, but not with regard to succession, 
for in that there is no persistence; consequently, that which is persistent must lie only in 
that which is simultaneous, or in the intelligible, which contains the ground of appearances. 
(Refl, AA, 18:612, R6312)





Perhaps the most significant textual evidence is found in the Critique:
As to the appearances of inner sense in time, it finds no difficulty in them as real things; 
indeed, it even asserts that this inner experience alone gives sufficient proof of the real exis-
tence of their object (in itself) along with all this time-determination. 
Our transcendental idealism, on the contrary, allows that the objects of outer intuition 
are real too, just as they are intuited in space, along with all alterations in time, just as 
inner sense represents them. For since space is already a form of intuition that we call 
outer, and without objects in it there would be no representation at all, we can and must 
assume extended beings in space as real; and it is precisely the same with time. (B519–20; 
emphasis added)7 
Thus, regardless of whether Kant’s Refutation is successful or not, there is a reasonable 
case to be made that the aim was to prove the existence of outer sense objects in the transcen-
dental sense of things in themselves. 
Thus, while neither the traditional two-world view nor the traditional two-aspect view 
can make sense of the Refutation as proof of the existence of things in themselves— “noumena 
in this merely negative sense” (A286/B342)—my view fits a certain widely shared interpretation 
of the goal of the Refutation, also endorsed by me, quite well. We do not know things as they 
are in themselves, but only as they appear to us as mere representations of our outer senses as 
bodies and of our inner sense as mental states or events. However, we do know the existence 
of this world in itself, which appears to our outer senses as permanent bodies in space, as the 
transcendental ground of the alteration or time-determination of our mental states and events 
in time, which is what Kant calls knowledge of the existence of “noumena in this merely nega-
tive sense” (A286/B342). Thus, according to this interpretation, the Refutation of Idealism is the 
proof of this existence of persistent things in themselves. 
7 Transcendental idealism allows for the reality of bodies in space, just as it allows for the reality of the 
object of inner intuition along with alterations in time. However, what accounts for or proves the alterations of 
my mental states in time is the existence of noumena outside me insofar as they appear to me as permanent 






6 The Fourth Paralogism
Now, I intend to show that my noumenal realism is the one that best fits the Fourth Pa-
ralogism without imputing to Kant either a Berkeleian idealism or a naïve realism.8 For the sake 
of argument, let us assume the two-aspect view in the Fourth Paralogism. According to this 
view, Kant’s answer to the external world skeptic is to “restore” our common-sense belief that 
by using our cognitive apparatus we are acquainted with mind-independent appearances in the 
empirical sense, that is, as appearances in space. Stroud (1984:131) seems to understand Kant’s 
idealism along these lines: 
For skepticism to be avoided, then, all accounts of our knowledge of the world as inferential 
or indirect must be rejected. The external things we know about must have “a reality which 
does not permit of being inferred, but is immediately perceived”. […] In both cases “the 
immediate perception (consciousness) of [things of those kinds] is at the same time a sufficient proof 
of their reality” (A371). We are in a position in everyday life in which “outer perception […] 
immediately proves of something real in space” (A375; emphasis added).
Stroud (1984:131) draws the natural conclusion that Kant’s “sufficient proof” is very much 
like Moore’s (1959/1963) proof of the external world. To avoid external world skepticism, all the 
Kantian must do is persuade the skeptic to look straight ahead at his hands:
We can now see that Kant insists on our possession of just the kind of knowledge G. E. 
Moore thought he was exhibiting in his proof of an external world. Moore thought that 
by holding up his hands before him as he did he had proved the existence of two external 
things. (Stroud 1984:132)
Again, since the Cartesian skeptic idealist is a transcendental realist in the first place (see 
A369), the skeptic is challenging us to prove the existence outside us, in the transcendental sen-
se, of things in themselves, rather than in the empirical sense, of representations in the outer 
sense. The best illustration of this is Stroud’s position (1984). He characterizes external world 
8 See Stroud 1984. Hanna has also defended a similar view (2000). But my focus here is Stroud’s reading 
of the Fourth Paralogism.   





skepticism by contrasting the ordinary standards for knowledge of everyday life with his higher 
philosophical skeptical standards (Stroud 1984:40). We can directly prove the existence of outer 
senses just by waving our hands. However, we cannot prove the existence of noumena in the 
same way. The question that the defender of the two-aspect view faces is the following: How 
could Kant possibly have thought that he was refuting the Cartesian sceptic just by waving his 
hands in this way à la Moore? Put differently, how could Kant have believed that by providing 
knowledge of the external world in the empirical rather than in the transcendental sense, he was 
meeting the Cartesian external world skeptical challenge? In light of this view, Kant’s answer to 
the external world sceptic of Cartesian provenance in the Fourth Paralogism makes little sense. 
Now, someone could believe that the two-world view fares better under this account. 
Kant is accusing the Cartesian sceptic of a Paralogism, that is, of mistaking the empirical for the 
transcendental sense of ‘things outside us’. In other words, the Cartesian sceptic is mistaking the 
representation of bodies in space (empirical sense) for the mind-independent world outside his 
consciousness (transcendental sense). 
In that sense, Kant’s answer to the external world sceptic is indeed much like Berkeley’s: 
The only way of avoiding external-word skepticism is to assume that material things are no-
thing but mental representations in us. For one thing, if material things are representations in 
us, we now have immediate access to them rather than mediated inference. That is what Kant 
is saying by controversially claiming that matter is nothing more than “a species of representa-
tions” (A370), and that “if I were to take away the thinking subject, the whole corporeal world 
would have to disappear” (A383). 
Now, regardless of whether this is a convincing answer to the Cartesian skeptical challen-
ge (certainly it is not), by saying that matter is just a representation in us, Kant is not endorsing 
Berkeley’s metaphysical claim that the outside world in the relevant transcendental sense is 
made up of mental states. Kant’s controversial statements of A370 and A383 must be unders-
tood epistemologically rather than metaphysically, at least if we take his complaints against 
Feder-Garve’s accusation as sincere. By claiming that matter is just a representation in us, Kant 
is claiming that matter is the mind-dependent way that unknown mind-independent things in 
themselves appear inside us. Therefore, my one-object phenomenalism is the reading of Kan-







In this concluding section, I argue that this view is the one that best harmonizes the Four-
th Paralogism with the widely-shared reading of the Refutation of Idealism that I outlined and 
defended above. The bottom line of my view is a clear distinction between the metaphysical and 
epistemological sides of Kantian idealism. Again, according to my reading, the mundus sensibilis 
and mundus intelligibilis are epistemologically distinct ways of considering the metaphysically 
identical outside world. Appearances are nothing but the way the things in themselves appear 
or exist inside our sensible minds as mere representations. In this sense, I reject the two-world 
view, the two-aspect view, and Allais’s deflationary anti-phenomenalist reading. 
Thus, in the Fourth Paralogism, Kant tries to persuade the Cartesian external-world 
sceptic that we do possess direct epistemic access to material things because material things 
are nothing but the immediate way that the mind-independent existing world of things in themselves 
mind-dependently appear to us as the objects of the outer sense. Finally, to refute the Feder-Garve 
accusation of being a metaphysical idealist à la Berkeley, in the Refutation of Idealism, Kant 
tries to prove the very existence of mind-independent things-in-themselves—noumena in the ne-
gative sense (A386/B342)—as the metaphysical ground of our mental appearances by arguing 
that such an assumption is the only explanation for the time determination or alteration of our 
mental states. 
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In this paper, I present a new reading of transcendental idealism. For a start, I endorse Allison’s rejection of the tra-
ditional so-called two-world view and hence of Guyer and Van Cleve’s ontological phenomenalism. But following 
Allais, I also reject Allison’s metaphysical deflacionism: transcendental idealism is metaphysically committed to 
the existence of things in themselves, noumena in the negative sense. Nevertheless, in opposition to Allais, I take 
Kant’s claim that appearances are “mere representations” inside our mind seriously. On the empirical sense, appe-
arances are the undetermined object of our sensible intuition. Yet, on the transcendental sense, appearances are 
nothing but the mind-dependent way that noumena manifest inside our minds and, hence, our mind-dependent 
way of knowing the mind-independent reality in itself (epistemological phenomenalism).  
Keywords  Transcendental Idealism; Metaphysical Idealism; Epistemological Idealism; Epistemological Pheno-
menalism; Ontological Phenomenalism.
RESUMO
Neste artigo, apresento uma nova interpretação do idealismo transcendental. Segundo tal leitura, endosso a rejei-
ção de Allison da leitura tradicional conhecida como visão dos dois mundos e, portanto, o fenomenismo ontológico 
defendido recentemente por Guyer e Van Cleve. Mas seguindo Allais, eu também rejeito o deflacionismo metafí-
sico de Allison: o idealismo transcendental está metafisicamente comprometido com a existência das coisas em si, 
noumena no sentido negativo. No entanto, em oposição a Allais, tomo seriamente a afirmação de Kant de que as 
aparências são “meras representações” em nossa mente seriamente. Com efeito, no sentido empírico, as “aparên-
cias” são o objeto indeterminado de nossa intuição sensível. No entanto, no sentido transcendental, as aparências 
nada mais são que o modo dependente da mente segundo o qual os noumena se manifestam dentro das nossas 
mentes e, portanto, nossa maneira mental de conhecer a realidade independente da mente em si (fenomenismo 
epistemológico).
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